so on… Why hold a balance of 100,000 anythings, if those anythings pay nothing, and cost so much to keep?

Considering the political balance at hand, of one company verses tens (and possibly hundreds) of thousands of investors, the pending situation was untenable. There was no way that the managers of DxInOne could force their members to pay fees out of pocket from month to month. If unchecked, the system as it stood would lead to an exodus of biblical proportions.

Pissing thousands of people off was not a good idea for other critical reasons. DxInOne had just morphed its web page into one of unquestionable (if not baffling) sophistication. This was merely a precursor of things to come down the pipeline: DxInOne was about to enter the realms of Ebay (auctioning) and Google (advertisin

The Great Crash of 2005 could have only occurred for one reason: there simply wasn’t enough money coming into the system the money was that was being withdrawn. It looked to me like the Glory Days had been backed by a hefty reserve fund that DxInOne had set in place. By this line of reasoning, The Crash was merely the culmination of a bizarre process of self-induced hemorrhaging. The company, it seemed, had been bleeding itself dry for months.

What were the consequences of The Crash?

Aside from the most crucial fact, that people couldn’t move money out of the system, there were two others.

The first one was the matter of The Crash’s effect on monthly fees.

Just like he would be required to at any bricks and mortar bank, the DxInOne member must pay monthly fees. The important point here is that until the time of the Crash, members were able to pay these fees from the profits their accounts generated each month. There was always more than enough money left over for profits and fee coverage: one simply had to order the fee-money out of the system, then boot it back in. The process rarely took more than three days. And waistlines grew.

But The Crash resulted in people not being able to move money out of the system. This therefore meant that people couldn’t pay their monthly fees according to the former process. By default, the only way to cover fees would be to pump new money into the system – from out of the members’ own pockets.

Suddenly, having a balance of $100,000 wasn’t quite so cool. Especially with fees in the 4% range. (I’m rounding up from the 3s here.) That’s $4,000 a month to keep an account that’s not paying anything. How would you like to wait, say, two months to move $150 out a system that would charge you $8,000 over this same period of time?

And so here we see the final consequence of the infamous Crash of Summer 2005:

A lot of people were freaking out.

Let us pause for a moment to consider the following chain of causality:

In Part One we saw that a DxInOne member’s monthly fees are a function of the size of his account balance. One factor affecting account balance growth is the daily gains generated on all DxInOne accounts. I had concluded that these growth rates must be arbitrarily determined by DxInOne management , at least to some extent. And this was because the daily gains were adding up to ten-or-so percent a month, at the very same time that the payment process mechanism was severely depressed. This would describe a paradoxical condition that’s continued without interruption for what is now seven months. (January 2006)

On this note we can return to $100k Guy, who is looking at having to pay $4,000 a month just to hold his account balance as things stand now. Yet with this account growing around 10% a month, he can be assured that the fees will rise, and probably by around the same rate of increase.

Maybe $100k Guy could do this for a month or two – he probably made more than that prior to The Crash. But how long would he stick around? $100k Guy could easily walk, and he probably would if staying in required him to pay $4,000 one month, then $4,400 after that, $5,300 the next and so on… Why hold a balance of 100,000 anythings, if those anythings pay nothing, and cost so much to keep?

Considering the political balance at hand, of one company verses tens (and possibly hundreds) of thousands of investors, the pending situation was untenable. There was no way that the managers of DxInOne could force their members to pay fees out of pocket from month to month. If unchecked, the system as it stood would lead to an exodus of biblical proportions.

Pissing thousands of people off was not a good idea for other critical reasons. DxInOne had just morphed its web page into one of unquestionable (if not baffling) sophistication. This was merely a precursor of things to come down the pipeline: DxInOne was about to enter the realms of Ebay (auctioning) and Google (advertisin

ant point here is that until the time of the Crash, members were able to pay these fees from the profits their accounts generated each month. There was always more than enough money left over for profits and fee coverage: one simply had to order the fee-money out of the system, then boot it back in. The process rarely took more than three days. And waistlines grew.

But The Crash resulted in people not being able to move money out of the system. This therefore meant that people couldn’t pay their monthly fees according to the former process. By default, the only way to cover fees would be to pump new money into the system – from out of the members’ own pockets.

Suddenly, having a balance of $100,000 wasn’t quite so cool. Especially with fees in the 4% range. (I’m rounding up from the 3s here.) That’s $4,000 a month to keep an account that’s not paying anything. How would you like to wait, say, two months to move $150 out a system that would charge you $8,000 over this same period of time?

And so here we see the final consequence of the infamous Crash of Summer 2005:

A lot of people were freaking out.

Let us pause for a moment to consider the following chain of causality:

In Part One we saw that a DxInOne member’s monthly fees are a function of the size of his account balance. One factor affecting account balance growth is the daily gains generated on all DxInOne accounts. I had concluded that these growth rates must be arbitrarily determined by DxInOne management , at least to some extent. And this was because the daily gains were adding up to ten-or-so percent a month, at the very same time that the payment process mechanism was severely depressed. This would describe a paradoxical condition that’s continued without interruption for what is now seven months. (January 2006)

On this note we can return to $100k Guy, who is looking at having to pay $4,000 a month just to hold his account balance as things stand now. Yet with this account growing around 10% a month, he can be assured that the fees will rise, and probably by around the same rate of increase.

Maybe $100k Guy could do this for a month or two – he probably made more than that prior to The Crash. But how long would he stick around? $100k Guy could easily walk, and he probably would if staying in required him to pay $4,000 one month, then $4,400 after that, $5,300 the next and so on… Why hold a balance of 100,000 anythings, if those anythings pay nothing, and cost so much to keep?

Considering the political balance at hand, of one company verses tens (and possibly hundreds) of thousands of investors, the pending situation was untenable. There was no way that the managers of DxInOne could force their members to pay fees out of pocket from month to month. If unchecked, the system as it stood would lead to an exodus of biblical proportions.

Pissing thousands of people off was not a good idea for other critical reasons. DxInOne had just morphed its web page into one of unquestionable (if not baffling) sophistication. This was merely a precursor of things to come down the pipeline: DxInOne was about to enter the realms of Ebay (auctioning) and Google (advertisin

3s here.) That’s $4,000 a month to keep an account that’s not paying anything. How would you like to wait, say, two months to move $150 out a system that would charge you $8,000 over this same period of time?

And so here we see the final consequence of the infamous Crash of Summer 2005:

A lot of people were freaking out.

Let us pause for a moment to consider the following chain of causality:

In Part One we saw that a DxInOne member’s monthly fees are a function of the size of his account balance. One factor affecting account balance growth is the daily gains generated on all DxInOne accounts. I had concluded that these growth rates must be arbitrarily determined by DxInOne management , at least to some extent. And this was because the daily gains were adding up to ten-or-so percent a month, at the very same time that the payment process mechanism was severely depressed. This would describe a paradoxical condition that’s continued without interruption for what is now seven months. (January 2006)

On this note we can return to $100k Guy, who is looking at having to pay $4,000 a month just to hold his account balance as things stand now. Yet with this account growing around 10% a month, he can be assured that the fees will rise, and probably by around the same rate of increase.

Maybe $100k Guy could do this for a month or two – he probably made more than that prior to The Crash. But how long would he stick around? $100k Guy could easily walk, and he probably would if staying in required him to pay $4,000 one month, then $4,400 after that, $5,300 the next and so on… Why hold a balance of 100,000 anythings, if those anythings pay nothing, and cost so much to keep?

Considering the political balance at hand, of one company verses tens (and possibly hundreds) of thousands of investors, the pending situation was untenable. There was no way that the managers of DxInOne could force their members to pay fees out of pocket from month to month. If unchecked, the system as it stood would lead to an exodus of biblical proportions.

Pissing thousands of people off was not a good idea for other critical reasons. DxInOne had just morphed its web page into one of unquestionable (if not baffling) sophistication. This was merely a precursor of things to come down the pipeline: DxInOne was about to enter the realms of Ebay (auctioning) and Google (advertisin

percent a month, at the very same time that the payment process mechanism was severely depressed. This would describe a paradoxical condition that’s continued without interruption for what is now seven months. (January 2006)

On this note we can return to $100k Guy, who is looking at having to pay $4,000 a month just to hold his account balance as things stand now. Yet with this account growing around 10% a month, he can be assured that the fees will rise, and probably by around the same rate of increase.

Maybe $100k Guy could do this for a month or two – he probably made more than that prior to The Crash. But how long would he stick around? $100k Guy could easily walk, and he probably would if staying in required him to pay $4,000 one month, then $4,400 after that, $5,300 the next and so on… Why hold a balance of 100,000 anythings, if those anythings pay nothing, and cost so much to keep?

Considering the political balance at hand, of one company verses tens (and possibly hundreds) of thousands of investors, the pending situation was untenable. There was no way that the managers of DxInOne could force their members to pay fees out of pocket from month to month. If unchecked, the system as it stood would lead to an exodus of biblical proportions.

Pissing thousands of people off was not a good idea for other critical reasons. DxInOne had just morphed its web page into one of unquestionable (if not baffling) sophistication. This was merely a precursor of things to come down the pipeline: DxInOne was about to enter the realms of Ebay (auctioning) and Google (advertisin

so on… Why hold a balance of 100,000 anythings, if those anythings pay nothing, and cost so much to keep?

Considering the political balance at hand, of one company verses tens (and possibly hundreds) of thousands of investors, the pending situation was untenable. There was no way that the managers of DxInOne could force their members to pay fees out of pocket from month to month. If unchecked, the system as it stood would lead to an exodus of biblical proportions.

Pissing thousands of people off was not a good idea for other critical reasons. DxInOne had just morphed its web page into one of unquestionable (if not baffling) sophistication. This was merely a precursor of things to come down the pipeline: DxInOne was about to enter the realms of Ebay (auctioning) and Google (advertising). They were about to roll out a 5 Star Hotel and a wristwatch of unparalled security, one which would enable them to enter and perhaps dominate the billionish-trillionoish realm of e-currency trading.

The new “DxInOne” website was merely a precursor to all of this, a platform whereby all DxInOne services could be accessed. By the time of the Crash, the new system was barely two months old. The monthly fee crisis threatened to sink a great liner just as it was leaving port for the very first time. Something had to be done.